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Introduction Since 2005 the IMF has been reviewing its medium-term strategy, largely in response to the 
debate on its role in the fi nancial crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Globalisation has 
unquestionably signifi cantly changed the role of the IMF and revealed certain defi ciencies in its 
functions and in the instruments used to carry them out. This debate has prompted refl ection 
on its role in an international economy in which a formal framework of co-operation barely ex-
ists between the national authorities and in which the growing fi nancial integration has enabled 
many emerging economies to benefi t from unprecedented access to the fi nancial markets, but 
which is highly vulnerable to sudden reversals of capital fl ows. Some of the matters addressed 
in recent months as part of this strategic review are: the role of offi cial fi nancing in crisis pre-
vention and resolution; how the IMF should respond in a situation such as the present one, 
characterised by growing global imbalances; and the build-up of reserves in a good number 
of emerging economies, which, on the one hand, denotes a desire for self-insurance so as not 
to depend on the IMF and, on the other, tends to aggravate these global imbalances1. The 
early repayment by Brazil and Argentina of their outstanding debt to the IMF in late 2005 and 
early 2006, respectively, added fuel to the debate on its role in the fi nancing of countries in 
crisis.
In general, the IMF’s crisis management has drawn criticism from both borrowers and lenders. 
For creditor countries, the large rescue packages have contributed primarily to distorting in-
centives, both those of investors (for proper risk assessment) and those of the country au-
thorities (for adopting appropriate economic policies). In the opinion of the borrower countries, 
however, the IMF’s fi nancial programmes have tended to impose excessively stringent domes-
tic adjustment, and the volume of assistance has not been suffi ciently predictable nor have the 
terms been adapted to the circumstances of each crisis.
One of the most interesting discussions regarding the role of offi cial fi nancing in emerging 
economies is to what extent there is a gap between the surveillance and fi nancing functions 
of the IMF that could make it advisable either to strengthen its signalling role, i.e. its ability to 
provide signals about its members’ economic policies that affect the decisions of interna-
tional investors, or to broaden its range of fi nancing facilities by adding an insurance-related 
instrument so that, in the event of adverse exogenous shocks, IMF members have assured 
access (under certain conditions) to its funds that is predictable in regard to volume and ma-
turity.
This article briefl y describes the context and terms of this debate, because of its topicality and 
signifi cance within the discussions on international fi nancial architecture.
The role of offi cial 
fi nancing in international 
fi nancial architecture
The fi rst manifestation of the impact of globalisation on the nature of balance of payments 
crises in emerging economies was the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995. In response to this crisis, 
the IMF led a rescue package unprecedented in the history of the international fi nancial sys-
tem: nearly USD 48 billion (USD 18 billion provided by the IMF itself), equal to 688% of its 
1. See IMF (2005).
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quota2. A few years later, the IMF granted further extraordinary fi nancial packages in the 
1997-1998 Asian crisis: USD 21 billion to Korea, equal to 1,940% of its quota; USD 10 billion 
to Indonesia, equal to 490% of its quota and USD 4 billion to Thailand, equal to 505% of its 
quota3.
In view of the virulence and increasing frequency of these capital-account crises, the IMF de-
cided to equip itself with new instruments. First, a new fi nancing facility, the supplemental re-
serve facility (SRF), was developed to meet needs for large-scale, short-term fi nancing derived 
from a sudden reversal of capital fl ows. And second, an insurance instrument known as the 
contingent credit line (CCL) extended the IMF’s fi nancial role to the area of crisis prevention, 
providing a certain degree of assurance against the systemic effects of fi nancial crises. This 
demonstrates the importance given in the late 1990s to the provision of offi cial fi nancial assist-
ance in constructing a new international fi nancial architecture and which crystallised in propos-
als to consolidate the IMF as a quasi-lender of last resort at international level, adopting a 
similar role to that of central banks at national level4.
However, as the IMF made increasingly large fi nancing packages available to countries, sharp 
criticism began to be heard that the funds were being used mainly to repay debt to private 
lenders and release them from assuming their part in the cost of fi nancial crises, thereby con-
tributing to distort the private sector’s incentives to properly assess the risk of its international 
lending (moral hazard). It was argued that the distortion of incentives was also observable in 
the authorities of the emerging countries themselves, which tended to adopt more lax eco-
nomic policies in the knowledge that the IMF would bail them out.
The debate on the moral hazard potentially created by IMF programmes, along with the fact 
that the IMF could not provide suffi cient funds to act as a lender of last resort, led the inter-
national community to reconsider the framework for crisis resolution and to adopt two sig-
nifi cant measures to reform it. First, as a result of the debate on the role of the private sector 
in crisis resolution, the so-called Prague framework5 was adopted in 2001. It established that 
the public sector and the private sector have to assume their respective shares of the fi nancial 
cost of a crisis when it occurs. The objective pursued was to balance the contributions of 
these two sectors in resolving a crisis and consolidate market discipline as the key to the 
functioning of the international fi nancial system. Second, in relation to access to IMF resourc-
es, the policy of exceptional access was adopted in 2002. This policy aims to constrain the 
discretionality with which the IMF had until then granted funds above the normal access limits 
and, at the same time, to enhance the clarity and predictability of the system. Consequently, 
from that time certain conditions were set for access to funds in excess of the limits, namely 
that: i) the country is under extraordinary pressure on its balance of payments, ii) its level of 
debt is sustainable, iii) there are grounds for considering that the country will regain access to 
the markets before the programme expires, and iv) the conditions exist for adequately imple-
menting the adjustment policies associated with the IMF programme. Also, an “exceptional 
circumstances clause” was included to cater for cases in which none of these conditions was 
met.
2. Member countries have access to IMF funds based on their quota. According to the normal access limits, a country 
can access in one year a volume of funds equal to 100% of its quota and it can access 300% cumulatively over three 
years. 3. These IFM programmes were supplemented with funds from the Asian Development Bank, from the World 
Bank and bilateral aid to make up rescue packages amounting to USD 57 billion in the case of Korea, USD 36 billion in 
Indonesia and USD 16.7 billion in Thailand. 4. See Fischer (2000). 5. The crisis resolution framework agreed upon in 
Prague establishes that the fi nancing needs arising in a balance of payments crisis should, after deduction of the related 
domestic adjustment, be covered by the following components: i) provision of offi cial fi nancing; ii) “spontaneous” cataly-
sis of private fi nancial fl ows, and iii) the more or less coercive assumption of losses by the private sector (private sector 
involvement).
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In short, since 2000 the international community has sought to reduce the weight of offi cial 
fi nancing in crisis resolution. That said, the practical application of this policy has caused con-
troversy. Some cases that have raised doubts regarding the application of this framework are: 
i) the extension in 2003 of the 2002 Brazilian programme, which, as a preventive project, in 
principle lay beyond the bounds of the exceptional access policy, since the pressure on the 
balance of payments was “potential” rather than real; ii) the 2003 Argentine programme, which 
was granted despite the evidence that the country’s debt balance was unsustainable; and iii) 
the 2005 Turkish and Uruguayan programmes, which were granted in the absence of extraor-
dinary pressure on their balance of payments.
The diffi culty in applying strictly the exceptional access policy has made plain the problems 
in consistently applying the crisis resolution arrangements that had been designed and has 
rekindled the debate on the role to be played by IMF fi nancing in the international fi nancial 
architecture. For some, limiting the moral hazard problems continues to be the priority and, 
consequently, they defend the setting of limits on the IMF’s fi nancing capacity, a strict ap-
plication of the Prague Framework and of the exceptional access policy and a strengthen-
ing of its surveillance – or signalling – function. Others, however, see the existence of 
market failure in the international fi nancial system and the systemic effects of fi nancial cri-
ses as reasons for strengthening the international fi nancial system’s safety nets and they 
defend the creation of a new insurance instrument as a means of preventing and, possibly, 
resolving crises; in their opinion, the diffi culties encountered in applying the exceptional 
access framework are not so much due to inappropriate application as to inadequate de-
sign.
The terms of the debate: 
signalling versus 
insurance
Two of the most important functions carried out by the IMF are signalling and insurance. Sig-
nalling refers to the IMF’s ability to send out signals that infl uence the decisions of interna-
tional investors or of the donor community (in the case of low-income countries) by giving a 
“stamp of approval” to the policy framework of its member countries. Basically, the IMF pro-
vides signals through: i) its surveillance instruments, e.g. its yearly reports on the economy of 
member countries6, and ii) the programmes and subsequent reviews of compliance with the 
conditions7 of these programmes. Insurance refers to the possibility of access to IMF resourc-
es that member countries have (based on their quota) and that provides them with some “in-
surance” against possible balance of payments needs.
The process of financial globalisation has heightened the importance of both functions, 
particularly because such adverse effects can be caused by sudden reversals of capital 
flows, as, for example, in the case of those that affected a certain number of emerging 
economies from the mid-1990s. That said, the international community does not have a 
unanimous stance on the weight that each of these functions should have in the new in-
ternational financial architecture. Put plainly, this means there is no consensus on the role 
that should be played by official financing in crisis prevention and resolution in a glo-
balised environment. The debate on the weight that the IMF should give to its signalling 
function as compared with its insurance function in emerging economies is due to differ-
ing views on such important underlying matters as: i) the origin and nature of balance of 
payments crises in these economies, ii) the impact of IMF financing on agents’ incentives, 
iii) the catalytic effect of its intervention on private financial flows, iv) the IMF’s financial 
capacity, and v) the desires of emerging countries in an increasingly globalised interna-
tional economy.
6. These documents are called reports pursuant to Article IV. 7. See Serra (2003).
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ORIGIN AND NATURE OF 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CRISES 
IN EMERGING MARKETS
It is generally acknowledged that two key factors explain the dynamics that have characterised 
fi nancial crises in the past decade: i) the application of inconsistent macroeconomic policies, 
and ii) the existence of failures in the functioning of international fi nancial markets. Having said 
that, the same consensus does not exist on the relative importance of each of these factors. 
Those who consider that failures in economic policy are the primary cause tend to defend the 
strengthening of signalling mechanisms to enable international investors to distinguish better 
between countries committed to a sustainable policy framework and those that are not, in the 
belief that market discipline will act to reward the former and penalise the latter. Nevertheless, 
those who consider that market failure is the main cause tend to defend the need to improve 
insurance mechanisms, since they feel that capital account liberalisation and international fi -
nancial integration may entail highly signifi cant risks for emerging economies over which at 
times the authorities have little infl uence.
Two reasons lie behind the IMF’s need to devise signalling mechanisms: information asym-
metries and the strengthening of incentives to adopt sound economic policies. Firstly, if the 
actions of a country’s authorities are not directly observable by international investors, those 
authorities would have an incentive not to keep the promises made to attract foreign invest-
ment, which in the long run would tend to reduce capital fl ows to emerging markets. Naturally 
these lesser capital fl ows would have a high cost in terms of lower economic growth, less ef-
fi cient fi nancial intermediation and worse allocation of resources at international level. Sec-
ondly, the logic of a signalling mechanism lies in the desirability of giving member countries an 
incentive to demonstrate their commitment to implementing an adequate combination of eco-
nomic policies. In principle, if signalling mechanisms worked properly, the authorities would 
have to assume a more palpable and immediate cost for straying from this policy frame-
work8.
For its part, an insurance mechanism is desirable because of the problems of multiple equi-
libria that tend to affect emerging markets when they face a liquidity crisis. Owing to a lack of 
co-ordination between creditors, if a liquidity problem arises, these tend not to grant an exten-
sion of loan maturities, despite the fact that arranging this extension collectively would mean 
that the country’s situation could be improved and the cost to be borne by the various parties 
involved would be lower. This problem of lack of co-ordination is aggravated by the self-con-
fi rming nature of fi nancial markets’ expectations, in that, as investors lose confi dence in a 
country and capital outfl ows begin, the situation worsens and the process tends to feed back 
on itself. Under this interpretation of balance of payments crises, it is also argued that informa-
tion problems prevent investors from distinguishing between a situation of illiquidity and one of 
insolvency, thereby activating the adverse market dynamics described above. An insurance 
mechanism would help to “co-ordinate” the agents, and this co-ordination would prevent such 
market dynamics from being activated and a liquidity crisis from resulting in insolvency, with its 
much greater economic cost.
IMPACT OF IMF FINANCING ON 
AGENTS’ INCENTIVES
As mentioned above, much of the debate on the reform of international fi nancial architecture 
has centred on the moral hazard problem posed by IMF programmes, basically those provid-
8. Insofar as low-income countries are concerned, the enhancement of the IMF’s signalling role has a different rationale. 
In these countries, international private fi nancial fl ows have a marginal importance compared with offi cial development 
aid. In this context, IMF signalling is basically intended to show how the task is to be divided up within the offi cial sector. 
The IMF would focus on establishing a macroeconomic conditionality that provides donors with a certain assurance of 
the sustainability of the countries’ policies. The funds would be provided by donors, rather than the IMF, because, among 
other reasons, balance of payments disequilibria in these countries tend to be due to structural factors requiring longer-
term development projects and strategies more suited to the mandate of institutions like the World Bank or regional de-
velopment banks. 
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ing exceptionally high access to its funds. This line of argument led to the constraint of IMF 
fi nancing as a result of the Prague Framework and the exceptional access policy. More re-
cently, the discussion on the introduction of programmes without fi nancing constitutes an-
other step towards reducing the role of IMF fi nancing and enhancing its signalling role. The aim 
is to limit moral hazard problems and consolidate market discipline as a key factor in the for-
mation of agents’ expectations and incentives.
However, the empirical fi ndings on moral hazard induced by the IMF do not support the fore-
going line of argument. The literature, which has concentrated on analysing the moral hazard 
of creditors, has studied the impact of IMF programmes on sovereign spreads and the price 
of certain fi nancial assets and, in general, has not found any solid evidence for the existence 
of a signifi cant moral hazard problem. There does, nonetheless, seem to have been a moral 
hazard problem in the Asian crisis, partly because of the precedent set by the 1995 Mexican 
rescue. However, the decision not to grant a fi nancial programme to Russia in 1998 (a country 
that in principle seemed “to big to fall”) possibly led to reconsideration of international market 
expectations on the availability of offi cial fi nancing for countries in crisis, and even more so 
following the 2001 Argentine crisis. The empirical literature, although not unanimous, tends to 
confi rm this impression: following the experience of Russia, international investors have dis-
criminated more fi nely between emerging markets, paying greater attention to the perform-
ance of their fundamentals and hence assessing their risks more accurately. These develop-
ments may be related to the improved transparency seen since then9.
Additionally, it has been argued that moral hazard is an inevitable characteristic of any type of 
intervention aimed at mitigating a certain “catastrophe risk”, although this does not justify a 
policy of “non-intervention”. A certain moral hazard associated with the presence of the IMF as 
a mechanism of international fi nancial protection should, according to this line of argument, be 
accepted in the same way as one accepts at domestic level the moral hazard derived from the 
role of central banks as lenders of last resort or from deposit insurance mechanisms. This does 
not mean that measures should not be taken to mitigate the distortions to agents’ incentives 
that may be generated by the IMF’s protection mechanism. But the objective of reducing the 
moral hazard associated with IMF fi nancing should be balanced with other objectives of the 
IMF, such as the strengthening of international fi nancial stability or crisis prevention and resolu-
tion. In other words, it is necessary to achieve a balance between “moral hazard” and “catas-
trophe risk”, taking into account that the measures designed to reduce one of them often in-
crease the other.
These arguments and empirical fi ndings are cited by the proponents of strengthening the in-
surance role of the IMF. They insist that the importance of moral hazard has been overstated 
and that not all the effects of IMF fi nancing on agents’ incentives are negative. If country au-
thorities assess the costs and the benefi ts of fi nancial integration in the world economy, the 
presence of a safety net provided by the IMF’s insurance function could tip the balance to-
wards a deepening of the processes of fi nancial liberation. This would both benefi t emerging 
economies, which would presumably obtain greater volumes of international investment, and 
improve the functioning of the international fi nancial system, since it would enable better diver-
sifi cation of risks worldwide.
CATALYTIC EFFECT OF THE IMF The importance of the IMF’s signalling role is based mainly on the premise that the IMF can 
signifi cantly infl uence agents’ decisions by providing signals such as the dissemination of the 
9. Regarding this improvement in transparency, see M. de Las Cases, S. Fernández de Lis, E. González-Mota and C. 
Mira-Salama (2004).
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results of bilateral surveillance, the announcement of a programme or the favourable review of 
compliance with its conditions. One of the main reasons is that the information has some of 
the features of a public good, so agents tend to devote a very few of their resources to obtain-
ing it and to resort to the reports of third parties for making their investment decisions. This 
problem is aggravated in transnational fi nancial transactions by the fact that the information is 
more disperse and diffi cult to obtain, particularly in the case of emerging economies and low-
income countries, which tend to be less transparent and have lower quality economic data. 
This market failure in regard to information would justify public intervention and the IMF, in view 
of its intellectual heritage, its global nature and its mandate, would seem be the most appropri-
ate institution to act as “delegate assessor” on behalf of market agents, by providing signals 
on the economic condition of its member states.
However, empirical fi ndings on the IMF’s catalytic role do not seem to support this idea. Most 
studies fi nd that the IMF has tended to overestimate its catalytic impact, and only in very 
specifi c circumstances of countries and depending on such matters as a country’s relation-
ship with the IMF and programme conditionality, has any signifi cant catalytic effect been 
found10.
Perhaps one of the factors contributing to limit the impact of the IMF’s signals is the increas-
ingly greater availability and quality of private information on emerging markets, which natu-
rally tends to erode the IMF’s informational superiority and therefore its ability to infl uence pri-
vate investors. This weakens the argument in favour of introducing facilities without fi nancing, 
since the greater availability of private information mitigates the asymmetries and market fail-
ures that might justify public intervention in the area of signalling. What is more, if empirical 
evidence shows that the catalytic effect of IMF fi nancial programmes has tended to be smaller 
than expected, it can be asked what this catalytic effect would be in a programme without fi -
nancing, even assuming the country in question undertook to meet conditions similar to those 
of a programme with fi nancing. This assumption is questionable because, without the incen-
tive of the successive payments under a conventional programme, the IMF’s ability to ensure 
compliance with conditions is weakened.
FINANCIAL CAPACITY OF THE IMF One of the key points of debate is whether the IMF can provide the funds needed to carry out 
an explicit insurance function or whether, in contrast, its fi nancial limitations should be recog-
nised and, accordingly, it is preferable to support the enhancement of its signalling function.
Naturally, the IMF’s credibility as an insurance mechanism would essentially depend on its abil-
ity to harness funds on a suffi cient scale to prevent the dynamic of a self-confi rming fi nancial 
crisis from establishing itself. Unlike other international fi nancial institutions, the IMF functions 
basically as a “co-operative” and has little capacity to act as a fi nancial intermediary. It has 
clearly defi ned fi nancial limitations, which can only be overcome by periodically revising its 
members’ quotas and, despite its current highly liquid position (which stands at a historical 
high), the fact is that its relative weight in the world economy has been declining in recent years 
in line with the rapid growth of private capital fl ows to emerging countries, which have risen 
from around USD 15 billion per annum in the 1970s and 1980s to more than USD 200 billion 
in 2004. The volatility of these capital fl ows has led to balance of payments problems that have 
tended to move from the current account to the capital account.
10. Some studies even fi nd that IMF programmes have a negative impact on private capital fl ows to a country, although 
this may be due to unresolved matters in the econometric specifi cations used and, in particular, to problems of sample 
selection. For an in-depth review of the catalytic effect of the IMF, see J. Díaz Cassou, A. García Herrero and L. Molina 
(2005). 
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In view of this, one of the main arguments against establishing an insurance mechanism is 
that, for it to have a signifi cant impact, the size of the IMF would have to be increased far be-
yond what can be considered feasible under the current quota system. That said, a counter-
argument that has been adduced is that if an insurance mechanism were mainly a crisis pre-
vention instrument, it would probably reduce the frequency of crises and hence would not put 
overly high pressure on IMF resources. Moreover, as seen in the Argentine crisis, the greater 
ability of international investors to discriminate between emerging markets has led to the mod-
eration of contagion phenomena, which would also tend to reduce the fi nancial requirements 
of an insurance mechanism.
DEMAND BY EMERGING 
COUNTRIES
There is reason to believe that emerging countries have little interest in a signalling mechanism 
based on facilities without fi nancing. These countries have scarcely expressed interest in fa-
cilities of this type and in some fora11 have even expressed opposition to their introduction. The 
predominant impression is that in emerging economies, especially the Asian ones, the de-
mand is rather for insurance-type mechanisms designed to limit the risks deriving from sudden 
reversals in capital fl ows. Two indications of this are, fi rst, the build-up of reserves by them in 
recent years12, and, second, the signature of regional agreements to swap reserves, such as 
the Chiang Mai initiative13. Both developments point to a desire for self-insurance which has 
been interpreted as a tendency by certain emerging countries to dissociate themselves from 
the IMF in view of its inability to cater to their needs14. This impression has grown following the 
recent decision by Brazil and Argentina to terminate their programmes with the IMF.
Proposals made for the 
introduction of signalling 
and insurance instruments
PROPOSALS FOR SIGNALLING 
INSTRUMENTS
Countries agreeing facilities without fi nancing would be subject to conditions that should, ideally, 
be similar to those of a traditional programme. There would be periodic revisions, to be approved 
by the Executive Board, but the IMF would make no kind of fi nancial commitment. This type of 
instrument would basically be aimed at countries with vulnerabilities, but without an immediate 
balance of payments problem, so that a traditional programme would not be justifi ed. It is ar-
gued that, in such cases, ordinary surveillance does not provide a suffi cient “seal of approval” for 
the country’s adjustment policies and that its acceptance, without receiving anything in return, of 
the conditions of a programme without fi nancing would amount to a stronger signal of its com-
mitment to sound economic policies, which might catalyse larger fl ows of private fi nancing (or, 
in the case of low-income countries, fi nancing from the donor community). In fact, a consensus 
has already been reached on the potential of these facilities without fi nancing for such countries 
and a new instrument, called the Policy Support Instrument (PSI), has recently been approved. 
Also, these facilities could be particularly useful for IMF-fi nancing exit strategies15.
When this type of instrument is proposed and designed, account must be taken, as already 
mentioned (and as the IMF itself has recognised) of the fact that the impact of the IMF’s signal-
ling has generally been less than expected16, largely because the IMF has tended to be very 
reluctant to issue negative signals, to avoid generating adverse market dynamics, and this has 
led to a loss of credibility for positive signals.
11. The G-24 has openly come out against facilities without fi nancing (G-24 Communiqué, October 2004). 12. The 
world volume of international reserves increased from USD 1.2 billion in 1995 to USD 3.8 billion in 2005. Approximately 
65% of these reserves are currently held by emerging markets, compared with 38% in 1995. 13. Since the year 2000, 
the participants in this initiative have been the member countries of ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea 
(ASEAN+3). 14. Other explanations of the IMF’s loss of infl uence in Asia are insatisfaction with the workings of the IMF 
governing bodies (problems concerning the right to speak and vote) and with the IMF’s response to the 1997-1998 Asian 
crisis. 15. The IMF already has strengthened surveillance instruments for countries when a programme with fi nancing 
expires, such as the Staff Monitoring Programme (SMP) and Post Programme Monitoring (PPM). However, the weakness 
of the signals issued by these instruments has led many countries to apply for subsequent programmes with fi nancing, 
as their facilities have expired, so compounding the problem of prolonged use of IMF resources and, therefore, weaken-
ing their revolving character, which is one of the IMF’s founding principles. 16. See IMF (2004).
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A key element in the design of facilities without fi nancing will be the conditionality that they 
should incorporate. In principle, this should be equivalent to that of traditional IMF programmes, 
which is well known by market agents. Another more diffi cult to resolve question is that of the 
link that these facilities without fi nancing should have to traditional programmes with fi nancing. 
Were balance of payments diffi culties to arise during the term of the programme without fi -
nancing, it would be diffi cult to fi nd arguments to deny the granting of a programme with fi -
nancing, given that the country would already be complying with the terms of conditions 
equivalent to those of this latter type of programme.
PROPOSALS FOR INSURANCE 
INSTRUMENTS
The insurance proposals that have been made so far are very different, but all have some sig-
nifi cant similarities. First, an insurance mechanism should incorporate a suffi cient amount of 
resources to check the adverse dynamics that may be triggered by an external shock, in a 
context of multiple equilibria and self-confi rmed expectations; given the size of the fi nancial 
markets and of the potential fi nancial crises, a mechanism of this type cannot be strictly in line 
with the normal limits of access to IMF resources. Second, an insurance mechanism should 
make the resources available to countries suffi ciently rapidly (although not necessarily auto-
matically) when the contingency covered by the insurance mechanism occurs, so that the 
dynamic that characterises self-confi rmed crises, which is sometimes very rapid, is halted in 
time. Third, the volume and conditions of the fi nancing to which an instrument of this type 
gives access should be known ex ante, to clarify the rules of the game, both for potential bor-
rowers and for fi nancial market participants. Fourth, and to mitigate the moral hazard prob-
lems to which this instrument may give rise, it should only be made available to those countries 
that apply prudent macroeconomic policies. The various proposals therefore include some 
component of ex-ante conditionality, usually articulated by means of a pre-qualifi cation mech-
anism.
The most widely expounded insurance proposal and the simplest to apply would be to broad-
en the exceptional access policy to embrace preventive programmes17. The fi rst condition of 
the exceptional access framework establishes that the normal access limits may be exceeded 
only by countries experiencing extraordinary balance of payments pressures. This condition 
precludes preventive programmes, since they are granted to meet potential balance of pay-
ments problems. That said, there are precedents for preventive programmes being granted 
beyond the normal access limits, as is the case of the extension made in 2003 to the Brazil 
programme approved in 200218, an extension that was made by appealing to the exceptional 
circumstances clause.
A second type of proposal19 consists of making the normal limits for access to IMF fi nancing 
a dynamic variable, determined by the past policies applied by each country. Thus, the more 
a country perseveres with the application of prudent macroeconomic and structural policies, 
the higher the level of IMF resources to which it would have access and, therefore, the higher 
the degree of insurance granted by the IMF. This approach has some advantages. First, it 
would extend to all IMF members, thereby limiting its discretionality and strengthening the 
predictability and universality of the scheme for crisis prevention and resolution, which is one 
17. Preventive programmes are lines of fi nancing that the IMF makes available to countries that agree not to use them 
unless it is strictly necessary to do so, i.e. unless a potential balance of payments problem actually arises. 18. In De-
cember 2003, the Brazilian programme originally approved in September 2002 was extended and expanded by USD 6.6 
billion. The Brazilian authorities announced at the time that they did not intend to use the programme’s resources, and 
therefore it became a preventive programme. There is broad agreement that this preventive programme enabled Brazil to 
make an orderly exit from its fi nancial relationship with the IMF. This was clear in March 2005, with the announcement by 
the Brazilian authorities that they would not seek to renew the IMF programme that expired at that time and with the fi nal 
cancellation of the programme in December 2005. 19. See Rajan (2005), and Ostry and Zettelmeyer (2005).
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of the objectives of reform of the international fi nancial architecture. Second, adequate incen-
tives would be given, thus limiting the moral hazard problems. And, third, continuous signals 
would be emitted on the “quality” of a country’s policy framework, which would, in principle, 
reduce the negative impact on the market of discrete signals arising from the activation/de-
activation of the pre-qualifi cation for these kinds of programme, this being one of the main 
problems with many proposals of this type.
Finally, various proposals have been made for a specifi c insurance facility for emerging econo-
mies. Most of them are based on a pre-qualifi cation mechanism, whereby only countries with 
solid foundations would have access. Other proposals suggest that the IMF should lend to 
these countries when their sovereign debt spread passes a certain threshold or that a liquidity 
window should be created at a pre-determined interest rate20.
The key to the success of a facility of this type is its design and, in this respect, the experience 
of the failure of the Contingent Credit Line (CCL) is most signifi cant. This facility was created in 
1999 as a preventive instrument to counter the risk of international contagion in those emerg-
ing markets committed to the maintenance of a prudent macroeconomic policy framework 
and was therefore essentially an insurance instrument. However, in 2003 this facility had to be 
allowed to expire because no country had requested it. There were signifi cant design failures: 
i) the impact that its request might have had on international fi nancial markets was not clear. It 
might have been interpreted as a sign of weakness revealing the existence of vulnerabilities, 
and not of a greater capacity to confront them, ii) at the same time there was an exit problem, 
since there was concern as to the impact that loss of eligibility for the CCL might have on 
markets, and iii) it was not clear to what extent the access to resources was automatic, since 
IMF Executive Board approval was required.
The CCL entry and exit problems were closely linked to the pre-qualifi cation mechanism that 
constituted the ex-ante conditionality and are, to a certain extent, inherent in any insurance 
instrument. One response to the stigma involved in requesting an insurance facility could be to 
strengthen the conditionality. The greater the extent to which the market interprets the criteria 
that give access to the insurance as truly demanding, the more the negative signal that might 
be entailed by agreeing this facility would be mitigated. That said, excessively strong condi-
tionality could mean that only those countries with very robust fundamentals, and thus less 
vulnerable to a crisis, would be eligible. In fact, it is worth asking what incentives a country with 
such characteristics would have to submit to strong conditionality when all it would obtain in 
return is the coverage of a risk perceived as very remote. 
One option for avoiding the CCL entry problem would be to make eligibility for the insurance 
facility automatic. This would mean that countries would not have to apply for the insurance, 
but access would instead be universal, provided the pre-qualifi cation criteria are met. How-
ever, the impact that generous use of this facility might have on the IMF’s resources would 
need to be studied.
Finding a solution to the exit problems is even more complicated, because any instrument in-
volving ex-ante conditionality generates the risk that failure to fulfi l the conditions might un-
leash adverse market dynamics. One can think of ways to moderate the negative impact of 
this signal. In the case of the CCL it has been argued that the relative vagueness of the eligibil-
ity criteria gave the IMF an excessive margin for discretion and, therefore, introduced a factor 
20. See Cohen and Portes (2004), and Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2005).
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of uncertainty that aggravated the exit problems. In principle, if this discretionality were re-
duced, the market could monitor countries’ eligibility for itself and the need for the IMF to issue 
unanticipated verdicts with destabilising effects would be eliminated. A system could be put in 
place, for this purpose, to determine eligibility “a la Maastricht”, on the basis of the fulfi lment of 
a set of criteria, directly observable by market agents, but not necessarily published by the IMF, 
summarising the ex-ante robustness of the policies applied by the countries.
Lastly, one of the lessons of the failure of the CCL is that the link between the insurance facil-
ity and access to IMF resources should be rapid and unambiguous. This means that it should 
be reasonably certain that, if the contingency covered by the insurance mechanism occurs, 
the country will have quasi-automatic access to IMF fi nancing on the terms established ex 
ante. For this to be so, it is necessary that i) there be a clear, operative and observable defi ni-
tion of the contingencies covered by the insurance mechanism; ii) compliance with the access 
conditions by the countries be monitored and updated frequently (so that the time between 
pre-qualifi cation and the possible activation of the fi nancing is not excessive), and iii) rapid and 
relatively simple administrative procedures be put in place to effect the provision of fi nancial 
assistance by the IMF.
Conclusions There has been a fruitful debate in recent years on the IMF’s role in relation to the emerging 
economies, which has coincided with a far-reaching strategic review of the IMF’s role. The 
lower frequency of crises in recent years and the cancellation of the programmes of many of 
the countries that had suffered crises in previous years partly refl ect advances in the interna-
tional fi nancial architecture, particularly in areas such as the transparency of the statistics and 
economic policies of these countries, the lower degree of contagion of crises and improve-
ments in their fundamentals. However, at the same time, there is some concern that the lower 
recourse to the IMF may also be a consequence of the inadequacy of its instruments to pro-
tect countries from the volatility of capital fl ows inherent in increasingly globalised fi nancial 
markets. The sharp accumulation of reserves by some of these countries would seem to re-
fl ect a certain desire for self-insurance, which would endorse this idea.
One of the possible shortcomings identifi ed is the gap between the IMF’s surveillance function 
and its fi nancing function. The debate has turned on the question of whether it is better to 
cover this gap with a signalling instrument or with an insurance one. Signalling instruments 
seem suitable for low-income countries, where the available information is of poorer quality 
and whose fi nancing comes from offi cial sources. For these countries the macroeconomic 
conditionality of the IMF represents a guarantee of commitment with solid fundamentals. How-
ever, the usefulness of signalling instruments in the case of emerging economies, whose infor-
mation has improved signifi cantly and whose capital infl ows come from private fl ows is more 
doubtful.
A priori, insurance instruments appear better suited to emerging economies, which face the 
risk of speculative attacks that sometimes have little or nothing to do with their fundamentals. 
However, designing a facility of this type comes up against complex problems, arising from the 
need to reconcile, on the one hand, a demanding pre-qualifi cation mechanism providing qua-
si-automatic access to the IMF’s resources, and on the other, a design that avoids the entry 
and exit problems that led to the failure of similar initiatives in the past. One solution that this 
article suggests might be worth considering would be the design of objective criteria (similar to 
the Maastricht criteria for access to Stage Three of EMU) that avoid a potentially destabilising 
process to establish eligibility.
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